Business Method Patents and Patent Floods by Meurer, Michael
Boston University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship 
2002 
Business Method Patents and Patent Floods 
Michael Meurer 
Boston Univeristy School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 Washington University Journal of Law 
and Policy 309 (2002). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/673 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access 
by Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty 
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more 
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.  
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES, LAW AND ECONOMICS 
WORKING PAPER NO. 02-02 
 
 
 
BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS AND PATENT FLOODS 
 
MICHAEL J. MEURER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Boston University School of Law Working Paper Series Index: 
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers 
 
The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=311087 
Business Method Patents and Patent Floods  
Michael J. Meurer  
forthcoming Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 
 Technological breakthroughs occasionally set off floods of inventions and 
associated patents. The decline of the business method exception to patentability is likely 
to increase the frequency of patent floods. Future technological breakthroughs might now 
cause two different patent floods: a flood of patents covering the relevant technology, and 
a flood of patents covering business methods in the new market opened by the 
breakthrough. Furthermore, a technological breakthrough is no longer a precondition for 
a patent flood. Any factor that opens a new market might cause a future flood of business 
method patents. 
 
 A flood of related patents in a new market creates special problems for 
competition in addition to the usual problems that arise from market power associated 
with individual patents. Patent floods strain the resources of the Patent Office and 
adversely affect the quality of issued patents. Of particular concern, reduced patent 
quality increases uncertainty about the scope and validity of patents and increases the 
frequency of patent litigation. The fragility of the many start-ups in new markets makes 
them vulnerable to strategic patent litigation. Furthermore, a thicket of patents may 
stultify development of technology because of the cost of securing patent licenses from 
the large numbers of patent owners. Cross-license agreements and patent pools mitigate 
problems caused by floods, but such agreements could be difficult to reach in response to 
future business method patent floods. The heightened risk of patent floods is a problem 
unique to business method patents, and justifies exceptional treatment of business method 
inventions. It is probably socially desirable to use the subject matter and nonobviousness 
standards for patentability to restrict grants of business method patents.  
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[O]ne of the great inventions of our times, the diaper service [is not patentable].1 
Giles S. Rich 
We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest.2  
Giles S. Rich 
Apres moi, le deluge. 
Louis XIV 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The decline of the business method exception to patentability will increase the 
frequency of patent floods. By patent flood, I mean a dramatic jump in the number of 
patents filed covering a specific class of inventions, as we now observe in e-commerce.3 
Floods are likely to become more frequent as future entrepreneurs respond to the 
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Thanks for helpful comments to Wendy 
Gordon, Scott Kieff, Mark Lemley, Maureen O’Rourke, Arti Rai, and participants at the American Law 
and Economic Association (2000) meeting, the Boston University School of Law faculty workshop, and 
the conference on Intellectual Property, Digital Technology & Electronic Commerce at Washington 
University Law School. This version: March 10, 2002. 
1 Giles S. Rich, “Principles of Patentability,” 28 Geo.Wash.L. Rev. 393, 394 (1960). 
2 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998), 
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999) (extinguishing the business method exception in a decision that 
confirms a diaper service is now patentable). 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 19-24. 
appearance of a new market with a spate of business method patent applications claiming 
new methods tailored to the new market.  
A flood of related patents in a new market creates special problems for 
competition in addition to the usual problems that arise from market power associated 
with individual patents. Patent floods strain the resources of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) and adversely affect the quality of issued patents. Of particular 
concern, reduced patent quality increases uncertainty about the scope and validity of 
patents and increases the frequency of patent litigation. The fragility of the many start-
ups in new markets makes them vulnerable to strategic patent litigation. This 
phenomenon may deter entry or induce exit from the market. Furthermore, a thicket of 
patents may stultify development of technology because of the cost of securing patent 
licenses from the large numbers of patent owners. 
Cross-licensing agreements and patent pools can mitigate the problems caused by 
patent floods, but may sometimes cause problems of their own. The historical record 
shows some successful pooling arrangements eliminated wasteful litigation and promoted 
technology development. Unfortunately, other pools fostered price-fixing agreements and 
other anti-competitive behavior. In some industries, patent floods did not stimulate patent 
owners to coordinate through cross-licensing or pooling, and innovation suffered. 
Besides hoping that patent pools will mitigate problems caused by floods we can 
take steps through patent law doctrine to reduce these problems. I argue that the PTO and 
the courts should use the subject matter and nonobviousness standards for patentability to 
limit grants of business method patents. My favored solution is reversal of State 
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Street4and restoration of the business method exception. Short of reversal, I argue for a 
narrow reading of State Street and rigorous application of the nonobviousness standard.  
In Part II of this Article, I recount the story of the recent demise of the business 
method exception to patentability and I categorize different business method patents. I 
explain that some “method patents” as defined by patent law really protect product 
features. These ersatz method patents that protect product features pose the greatest risk 
of patent floods and threat to competition. In Part III, I predict that as markets open in the 
future we will often see a flood of business method patents. (Evidence for the prediction 
is the current flood of Internet related business method patents.) In Part IV, I describe the 
problems that follow from a patent flood: low quality patents, increased litigation, 
exclusionary conduct, and delay of cumulative innovation. In Part V, I address the history 
of patent pools and cross-licensing agreements that have emerged in response to previous 
patent floods, as well as the benefits of pools compared to the risk that they may facilitate 
cartelization or other antitrust problems. Finally, in Part VI, I discuss the role of the 
patentable subject matter requirement and the nonboviousness standard in regulating 
future patent floods. 
II. BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS 
A. The Business Method Exception 
 Section 101 of the Patent Act specifies that patentable subject matter includes 
“any new or useful process, … or any new and useful improvement thereof….”5 Despite 
such broad language, 6 some processes have never been considered patentable subject 
                                                 
4 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
5 35 U.S.C. §101. 
6 Section 100(b) provides an unhelpful definition of process as a “process, art or method, and includes a 
new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or method.” 35 U.S.C. 
§100(b). 
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matter. For example, purely mental processes are not patentable.7 Additionally, the steps 
of a square dance or the process of calling the dance are not patentable.8 Until recently, 
the business method exception precluded patents on most business-related processes.10  
 Courts have struggled to clearly state a principle for dividing patentable from 
unpatentable processes. One approach limits patents to industrial processes,11 while 
another approach limits patents to processes that manipulate artifacts or cause physical 
effects.12 A new standard announced in State Street and confirmed in AT&T v. Excel,13 
expands patentable subject matter to include processes that produce a “useful, concrete 
and tangible result.”14 While I business method exception was compatible with the earlier 
                                                 
7 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
8 The square dance and call are both copyrightable subject matter if they are original and  fixed. See 17 
U.S.C. § 102(a). 
10 See Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Decision: The Bad Business of Unlimited Patent Protection for 
Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELLECTUAL PROP., MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT L. J. 61 
(1999) (describing the ruling as a “sweeping a departure from precedent”). Despite the business method 
exception, there are occasional examples of business method patents throughout the last century. USPTO, 
White Paper on Automated Financial or Management Data Processing Methods (Business Methods), 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/index2.htm  
 
Automated financial/management business data processing method patents cannot trace their 
origins back to the founding of our nation. However, contrary to popular view, they did not 
suddenly spring into being in the late 1990’s. On January 8, 1889, the era of automated 
financial/management business data processing method patents was born. United States patents 
395,781; 395,782; and 395,783 were granted to inventor-entrepreneur Herman Hollerith on that 
date. (Footnote 5) See Appendix B for Mr. Hollerith’s Patents. Mr. Hollerith’s method and 
apparatus patents automated the tabulating and compiling of statistical information for businesses 
and enterprises. They were acclaimed nationally and viewed as revolutionizing business data 
processing. The protection of his patents allowed his fledgling Tabulating Machine Company to 
succeed and thrive. In 1924, Thomas J. Watson, Sr. changed the company name to International 
Business Machine Corporation. Hollerith manual punch cards (IBM punch cards) and his methods 
for processing business data were still being used up until the birth of the personal computer era. 
 
11 See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40  B.C.L.REV. 1139, 1143, 1178-85 
(1999). 
12 See id. at 1147, 1174; Ex parte Turner, 1894 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 36, 38. 
13 AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
14 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373; see also AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1361. 
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narrower definitions of patentable processes, the new, expansive definition vitiates the 
exception. 
 In State Street, State Street Bank sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity of 
against Signature Financial’s patent relating to software used to administer a type of 
mutual fund.15 The patent claims describe a computerized accounting system that 
calculates daily share values. The district court ruled in favor of State Street Bank, 
invalidating the patent under  the business method exception,.17 and the mathematical 
algorithm exception.18  
On appellate review, Judge Rich denounced the business method exception. He 
complained that it was unworkable in the PTO21 and not firmly grounded in case 
law.22Judge Rich was more deferential toward the mathematical algorithm exception 
which originated in Gottschalk v. Benson.23 In that case, the Supreme Court denied patent 
protection to computer software designed to convert one type of number into another type 
                                                 
15 Specifically, a mutual fund with a hub and spoke structure that is open only to other mutual funds. This 
fund holds tax advantages. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1370. 
17 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 927 F.Supp. 502, 512-16 (D. Mass. 
1996).  
18 Id. at 511. (“[T]he best clue to patentability [is] the mathematical algorithm/physical transformation 
test... [this invention is not patentable because it is] “designed to manipulate and record numbers.”) 
21 Judge Rich cited Patent Office guidelines stating “Office personnel have had difficulty in properly 
treating claims directed to methods of doing business.  Claims should not be categorized as methods of 
doing business.  Instead such claims should be treated like any other process claim.” 61 Fed.Reg. 7478, 
7479 (1996) cited in State Street, 149 F.3d at 1377. 
22 Id. at 1375-76. 
23 409 U.S. 63 (1972). For a discussion of the mathematical algorithm exception see generally Pamela 
Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer-
Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L. REV. 1025 (1990). 
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of number. The State Street district court believed Signature’s invention was governed 
squarely by Benson.24 Judge Rich disagreed; he argued that unlike the software in 
Benson, Signature’s invention achieves a useful, concrete, and tangible result, so the 
mathematical algorithm exception does not apply.25 Essentially, Benson is 
distinguishable because Signature’s method manipulated numbers representing share 
value. 
The State Street decision set off a flood of e-commerce patents. The typical e-
commerce patent has two distinguishing attributes: “(1) it describes an essentially 
commercial (as opposed to technological) activity, typically some way to make or save 
money; and (2) the hardware and software elements are described and claimed at such a 
high level of generality that they are for all practical purposes nominal.”26 A wide variety 
of business methods are now protected. For example, the PTO has issued patents 
covering financial instruments,27 on-line gambling,28 electronic postage,29 health care 
administration systems,30 and a method of distributing digital music.32  
B. Taxonomy of Business Method Patents 
                                                 
24 See State Street, 927 F.Supp. at 513-15. The district court judge was convinced that the reasoning in In 
re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed.Cir.1994) applied. In that case the Federal Circuit found that the a computer 
implemented method for bidding at an auction was unpatentable because it was a mathematical algorithm 
that did not give rise to any physical effect. Id. 
25 See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373-74. 
26 Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights For Business 
Concepts And Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 note 5 (1999). 
27 See U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (mutual fund); U.S. Patent No. 4,839,804 (patent on a certificate of 
deposit that is designed to appreciate to meet college expenses, litigated in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 144 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999)); U.S. 
Patent No. 4,346,442 (patent on a system combining a charge card, a money market account, and a 
brokerage account, litigated in Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983)). 
28 U.S. Patent No. 5,800,268 (online gambling). 
29 U.S. Patent No. 6,240,196 (electronic postage). 
30 U.S. Patent No. 4,916,611 (automated health care payment) and U.S. Patent No. 5,070,452 ( COBRA 
compliance system). 
32 U.S. Patent No. 5,191,573 (online music distribution). 
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The following taxonomy classifies business methods in terms of their effect on 
market behavior. Business-related inventions can be claimed as both products and 
processes,33 and the business method exception was applied to both. The invention in 
State Street was claimed as a business system (i.e. machine) rather than a process because 
the law once favored software claimed as part of a system over software claimed as part 
of a process.34 Sensibly, the business method exception extended to such system claims 
to block evasion of the rule. Courts could construe State Street narrowly to eliminate the 
business method exception only for business system patents, but the language in the case 
indicated that Judge Rich wanted to dispose of the exception entirely. ATT v Excel 
followed soon after State Street and left no doubt on this matter. An AT&T invention 
claimed as a process involving pricing of long distance phone service was judged to be 
patentable subject matter.35  
 Instead of focusing on claim format, I will focus on whether a business method 
patent protects a true process innovation or a product-related innovation. To capture the 
distinction between process innovations and product-related innovations I will introduce 
the terms administrative method and customer service method to classify business 
methods. Administrative methods are back-office methods that increase productivity or 
reduce organizational or production costs in a firm.36 Customer service methods yield 
                                                 
33 Following a common practice, I use the term product informally to mean machine, or system; and I use 
the term process to mean process, art or method. 
34 The case In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, (Fed. Cir.,1994) led patent applicants to favor machine claim 
format for software inventions. The patentee in Alappat successfully claimed a software related process as 
a machine by using means-plus-function language. 35 U.S.C. 112 para 6. 
35 U.S. Patent No. 5,333,184 (long distance telephone billing system). 
36 For example see Louis Uchitelle, Business To Business: It's Just the Beginning, N. Y. Times, June 7, 
2000 (“A decade ago, before the Internet, Wal-Mart connected the cash registers in its stores to its 
thousands of suppliers so that a shirt sold in Omaha registered with the company that made it in South 
Carolina. That pioneering system, however, required a huge investment in special computers and dedicated 
phone lines. Few other companies matched Wal-Mart's achievement, and in 1998 Wal-Mart itself switched 
its network entirely to the less expensive, more flexible Internet.”) 
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services that are consumed by customers or methods related to pricing, advertising or 
other marketing concerns. I base this distinction on the function of the innovation in the 
market. Some business methods are consumable services and others are processes that 
contribute to business productivity.  
There are two reasons to classify some business methods as product related 
innovations. First, the economic definition of product encompasses goods and services. A 
service like a massage is consumed by an end-user, and a patent on a new method of 
massaging protects a new product variety. Second, some method patents give de facto 
protection to a product variety as well as a process. A broad patent that protects the only 
method (or only practical method) of implementing a financial security extends de facto 
protection to the financial security.38  
Customer service method inventors may create either new product varieties or 
new product features.39 Many business method patents could effectively provide 
exclusive rights to a new product variety in an established market. Examples include: the 
Signature Financial patent on the hub-and-spoke mutual fund,40 and other securities 
based patents could protect new varieties of securities;41 the patent covering the use of 
                                                 
38 Economists speak of drastic and non-drastic process innovations. A drastic process innovation reduces 
that marginal cost of producing a product by a magnitude so large that no firm using a pre-existing process 
can compete with the innovator even if the innovator charges a monopoly price. Any process innovation of 
a lesser magnitude is called non-drastic. A patented drastic process yields de facto exclusive rights to the 
product produced using the process. See Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 411-12 (1988). 
39 A customer service inventor may even create a new product. For example, someone may create an online 
method for consumer financial management, and gain exclusive rights to the market from a patent. I am not 
aware of any current business method patents that protect a new product, but I would not be surprised to 
see future examples. 
40 See supra note 23 
41 Id. 
 8
online experts could protect a new variety of consulting;42 the patent covering online 
gambling could protect a new variety of gambling;43 the patent on electronic postage 
protects a new substitute for the postage stamp and postal meters;44 and the patent on a 
cash management account protects a new variety of financial service.45 It is too early to 
tell whether these patents will actually give exclusive rights to a new product variety. We 
must wait for more information to assess the validity and breadth of these patents. If 
these patents are valid but have a relatively narrow scope that would leave the patent 
holder with an advantage in the market for the new variety but no exclusivity. 
Other method patents relate to new product features instead of new product 
varieties. For example, many e-commerce patents protect features of Internet retailing 
sites. Patents have been granted on: an online auction method;46 a method for real-time 
payments for Internet transactions;47 an online method of evaluating credit risk;48 a 
                                                 
42 U.S. Patent 5, 862,223 relates to the use of online experts. Similarly, a variety of wedding consultation 
might be protected by a method patent. See Jeffrey A. Berkowitz Patenting The Com In ".Com": 
Ecommerce: Strategies For Success In The Digital Economy, 570 PLI/Pat 643, 664 (Practising Law 
Institute, PLI Order No. G0-009O, August/September, 1999) (“The Wedding Channel has a patent for 
planning weddings, and the Home Gambling Network has a patent for remote, live wagering.”) 
43 See id. at 670-671 (“Having just received U.S. Patent No. 5,800,268 in September 1998, for a ‘Method 
of participating in a live casino game from a remote location,’ Home Gambling Network (HGN) wasted no 
time in enforcing its rights. In early December 1998, the company sued Interactive Television Services for 
patent infringement. The company then sued several other concerns, including UUNET, and settled with 
them in early March of 1999. Most recently, on April 6, 1999, HGN sued Starnet Communications for 
patent infringement.”) 
44 See id. at 668 (“Pitney Bowes, Inc., the dominant player in the postage-meter business, has several 
patents on computer-based postage metering. That company has been in contact with two companies 
involved in online postage systems, E-Stamp and Stamp Master, to discuss licensing those patents. The 
U.S. Postal Service has approved E-Stamp's and Stamp Master's systems for buying postage over the 
Internet and printing it onto envelopes. Pitney Bowes filed suit against E-Stamp, charging it with 
infringement of the Pitney Bowes patents.”) 
45 See Paine Webber v. Merrill Lynch 564 F.Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983). (The patented invention combined 
a securities account, a money market account, and a credit card. The advantage of this combination was 
better cash management (less idle cash), a higher credit limit on the credit card, and integrated monthly 
statements.) 
46 U.S. Patent No. 5,794,207. 
47 U.S. Patent No. 5,974,146. 
48 See Berkowitz supra note 35 at 666. 
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method for paying web users who view web advertising;49 credit card security methods;50 
methods of protecting consumer privacy;51 and a method of purchasing using one mouse 
click.52 Broad and valid patents of this sort allow a patent owner to differentiate its retail 
site by offering attractive and unique features. Customer service methods also include 
contract terms and other marketing strategies that economists treat like product features. 
Recent patents cover: airline ticket options;53 a method related to long-distance telephone 
pricing;54 a method that gives buyers price discounts based on the volume of orders;55 
electronic distribution of coupons;56 and customized Internet promotions.57  
Administrative method patents reach all sorts of management techniques. There 
are financial method patents relating to the analysis and presentation of financial data.58 
There are patents on inventory and distribution management methods.59 There is a patent 
on a payment system.60 Various Internet-based manufacturing consulting inventions are 
probably patentable.61  There are even patented law-related administrative methods.62  
                                                 
49 See id.at 661. 
50 See U.S. Patent No. 5,724,424. 
51 See Berkowitz supra note 35 at 666 
52 The specification of U. S. Patent No. 5,960,411 states, “The present invention provides a method and 
system for single-action ordering of items in a client/server environment. The single-action ordering system 
of the present invention reduces the number of purchaser interactions needed to place an order and reduces 
the amount of sensitive information that is transmitted between a client system and a server system.” See 
Theresa Riordan, Patents Considered Vital to Thrive on the Internet, New York Times, Dec. 20, 1999 
(Amazon.com holds a patent on a system that enables repeat online customers to avoid re-entering data 
when placing an order). 
53 See U.S. Patent No. 5,797,127; Merges, supra note 22 at note 5 (patent “covers ‘airline ticket options,’ 
i.e., the purchase and sale of the right to buy tickets at a later time for a specified price.”) 
54 See supra note 30. 
55 See Berkowitz supra note 35 at 666 
56 See U.S. Patent No. RE 34,915 (litigated in Home Shopping Network, Inc. v. Coupco., Inc, 1998 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2111 (S.D.N.Y.  1998)). 
57 See U.S. Patent No. 6,009,411 (method for distributing promotions over the Internet) 
58 See U.S. Patent No. 5,940,810, (method used to value securities). See also Berkowitz supra note 35 at y 
(“Block Financial Corp. received a patent for accessing recent financial information from a variety of 
providers using a variety of presentation tools.”) 
59 See U.S. Patent No. 4528,643 (covers a method of digital music distribution). 
60 See supra note 26(health care payment method). 
61 A recent article describes three innovations at General Electric that are patentable subject matter after 
State Street. See Douglas Frantz, To Put G.E. Online Meant Putting a Dozen Industries Online, E-
Commerce: A Special Section, New York Times, March 29, 2000. First, GE developed a web site where its 
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Patenting customer service methods is more problematic than patenting 
administrative methods. Since customer service methods are closely connected to a 
particular market, the opening of a new market will induce a flood of customer service 
method inventions and patents. Administrative method inventions are less tied to a 
particular market and should not create the same risk of floods. Interestingly, proponents 
of business method patents tend to point to administrative method inventions to make 
their case, and opponents point to customer service methods. The recent PTO White 
Paper in this area emphasizes that business method inventions in Class 705, automated 
data processing methods, follow a long tradition of invention in the field of data 
processing machinery like the IBM tabulator machine.63 On the other hand, opponents 
point to the patents on securities and ask whether there was adequate incentive for 
financial innovation without patents.64 
III. PATENT FLOODS 
                                                                                                                                                 
engineers in 100 countries can share ideas and work on projects simultaneously. Id. Second, G.E. created 
“‘wizards’ that enable customers to solve complex problems on the Web. A design engineer at a 
manufacturing company, for example, can log on to the G.E. plastics site and use a specialized engineering 
calculator to determine a polycarbonate's strength, adhesion and color.” Id. And third, the G.E. aircraft-
engines business implemented imaging methods through a web site in a way that cuts the cost of engine 
repairs. In the past, a G.E. representative would visit a customer and inspect engine parts to decide whether 
they could be retained or rebuilt, or discarded for a new part. Now much of that work can be done cheaply 
and quickly over the Internet with images transmitted from the customer to G.E. Id. 
62 See supra note 26 (method for assuring COBRA compliance); see also Theresa Riordan, Patents 
Considered Vital to Thrive on the Internet, New York Times, Dec. 20, 1999 (describing a patent on a 
method of allocating assets in a divorce settlement); U.S. Patent No. 6,246,991 (patented software for 
implementing multimedia wills). 
63 See USPTO White Paper, Automated Financial or Management Data Processing Methods (Business 
Methods) www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/index.html. Business machines really play a role in a firm 
that is comparable to an administrative method. The photocopier is a durable business machine that 
provides a flow of copying service. A substantial portfolio of patents relating to xerography gave Xerox a 
monopoly in the market for photocopiers. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204 (2nd Cir., 
1981).  Buyers and lessees value this copying service the same way they value an administrative method 
that reduces some other administrative cost. I imagine that if Xerox had invented and patented an 
administrative method related to document management that drastically reduced the number of copies 
required by organizations the economic effect would have been quite similar to the actual case. 
64 See infra notes 123-24. 
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A patent flood occurs when many inventors apply for patents on similar 
inventions during an interval of a few years.65 A recent example is the flood of gene 
patents.66 The development of efficient gene sequencing technology and the Human 
Genome Project provided the impetus for a flood of gene discoveries and patents.67 
Earlier patent floods occurred in the motion picture, airplane, and petroleum refining 
industries. The motion picture and airplane patent floods followed the efforts of Edison 
and the Wright brothers demonstrating technical feasibility of the motion picture and the 
airplane. The flood of petroleum refining patents followed the discovery of the cracking 
process of refining. The flood of e-commerce and other business method patents68 is the 
latest patent flood. 
 There has been a dramatic rise in the number of business method patents since 
State Street.69 In particular, the number of e-commerce patents has jumped,70 as have the 
number of financial patents.71 Two factors jointly caused the flood of e-commerce 
patents: (1) the introduction of the Internet; and (2) the demise of the business method 
                                                 
65 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, 
University of California at Berkeley, March 2001 http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/~shapiro/thicket.pdf page 
5 (noting the recent patent floods in various industries) 
66 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, May 1, 1998. 
67 See Andrew Pollack, Approaching Biology from a Different Angle: Scientist at Work: Leroy Hood, N. Y. 
Times, April 17, 2001, available at www.nytimes.com/2001/04/17/health/17HOOD.html. 
68 See Richard H. Stern, Scope-of-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of Doing 
Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELLECTUAL PROP., MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT L. J 105, 154 (1999). 
(“Given the boom or land rush in applications for patents on methods of doing business, particularly in 
regard to electronic commerce, the matter is urgent.”) 
69 See Sabra Chartrand, Patents: E-Commerce Spurs Changes at Patent Office, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 2000. 
In 1997 the PTO established department 570 for business method patents. Applications rose from 920 in 
1997, to 1,300 in 1998, and to 2,600 in 1999. In 1999, The PTO issued 583 business method software 
patents. Id. 
70 See supra Stern note 61, at 154; Riordan, supra note 45. There are about half a dozen firms modeled 
after Walker Digital; they hope to be patent factories. Walker Digital has received 30 patents including the 
key Priceline.com patent covering online auctions. Walker Digital also has 300 patent applications 
pending. 
71 Josh Lerner, Where Does State Street Lead? A First Look at Finance Patents, 1971-2000, 7-8 available 
at http://www.people.hbs.edu/jlerner/StateStreet.pdf. There was a dramatic increase in the number of 
financial patents starting in 1997. 
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exception. The introduction of the Internet is a technical breakthrough equivalent to the 
Wright brothers’ flight at Kitty Hawk. The Internet makes e-commerce possible and e-
commerce creates new opportunities for invention.  
 Equally, the expansion of patentable subject matter sanctioned by State Street 
caused the flood of e-commerce patents since most of the e-commerce inventions would 
not be patentable subject matter under pre-State Street standards. In contrast, the flood of 
financial patents is caused strictly by the demise of the business method exception 
because there has not been a technical breakthrough in the financial services industry.72 
 Eliminating the business method exception will increase the frequency of future 
patent floods. Past patent floods were set off by a technical breakthrough. Such technical 
breakthroughs will continue to occur and set off patent floods. Any change in patent law 
that increases the range of patentable subject matter will naturally increase the frequency 
of patent floods by bringing a wider range of technology within the ambit of patent 
protection. Thus, the Chakrabarty decision, which confirmed that living organisms are 
patentable subject matter, increased the likelihood of biotechnology patent floods by 
broadening the range of biotechnology that is patentable. State Street had the same effect 
in the field of business methods.  
                                                 
72 Defenders of State Street disagree with my view that the case eliminated the business method exception. 
Both Judge Rich and Judge Newman in her dissent in In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 297-98 (.Fed. Cir.,1994) 
searched the case law and found only weak support in dicta from a few cases establishing a business 
method exception. Judge Rich intended to dispel the misperception that a business method exception 
existed. He argued that cases supposedly standing for the business method exception could be better 
explained through application of the rule that abstract principles are unpatentable. Although I think his 
treatment of the cases is reasonable, Judge Rich evades the longstanding Patent Office rule against patents 
on business methods and the consensus among commentators (including himself at an earlier date) that 
there was a business method exception. For further critical commentary see the excellent analysis in 
Thomas, supra note 10 at x. 
 Regardless, whether State Street eliminated the business method exception or simply clarified 
established law, it set off a flood of business method patents. Defenders of State Street admit this. They 
blandly assert that State Street made practitioners aware of a class of inventions they had previously 
overlooked. See PTO, supra note 56, at x. 
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But State Street has two other effects that create special concern. First, a 
technological breakthrough is no longer a precondition for a patent flood. Any factor that 
opens a new market might set off a future flood of business method patents. New markets 
might often yield various new methods of doing business – all of which can now be 
patented. Second, future technological breakthroughs might now set off two different 
patent floods: a flood of patents covering the relevant technology, and a flood of patents 
covering business methods in the new market opened by the breakthrough.73 
  Fears about future business method patent floods could be allayed by a narrow 
interpretation of State Street and a rigorous application of the nonobviousness standard. 
The courts, though, may allow a broad reach of patent law to all sorts of business 
methods74 with a modest role for the nonobviousness requirement. A broad reading of 
State Street allows business method claims that do not mention software.75 Judge Rich 
apparently acknowledged the pre-computer method, in Hotel Security Checking Co. v. 
Lorraine Co.,76 is patentable subject matter. The patent covered a manufacture and a 
process designed to prevent waiters and other restaurant employees from falsifying sales 
and receipts. Judge Rich explained that the patent was invalidated on obviousness 
                                                 
73 Note that even if the technical breakthrough does not set off a flood of technology-based patents, for 
example because a pioneer inventor secures broad patent rights, it is still possible that there will be a flood 
of business method-based patents. 
74 Several scholars have expressed concern about the broad reach of State Street. See Stern, supra note 61, 
at 154 (“Accordingly, a line of subsequent poor decisions based on State Street should be anticipated.”) 
See Raskind, supra note 9, at 91 “A further source of unease over this opinion is its potential for generating 
a boom in business method patents. This protection extends to fields other than financial services.” 
“Banking, insurance, and accounting are most likely to be immediately involved in seeking such patent 
protection. However, protection is unlikely to be limited to these sectors…” John R. Thomas, The Post-
Industrial Patent System, 10 FORDHAM INTELLECTUAL PROP., MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT L. J. 3, 4 
(1999). “In its place the Federal Circuit required only that a claimed process achieve a useful result, an 
exceptionally lenient standard that appears to place few limitations on the possibilities for private 
appropriation. Keenly aware of these holdings, applicants have besieged the Patent Office with 
applications ranging from financial software to Internet-based business models.” 
75 See Merges supra note 22 at note 24. Cf. Amazon.com, Inc., v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 2001 U.S. 
App. Lexis 2163  (Fed. Cir. 2001). p.44 The '411 patent specification states that "one skilled in the art 
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grounds and not because it claimed a business method. After State Street he would also 
judge a diaper service to be patentable subject matter. More significantly, basic business 
method innovations like the distribution system at Sear’s,77 the multi-divisional structure 
of the firm, and the Fed-Ex hub and spoke air delivery system are now likely to be 
patentable subject matter. 
IV. PROBLEMS CAUSED BY PATENT FLOODS 
Patent floods can exacerbate three social costs attributable to patents: (1) high 
licensing and litigation costs; (2) exclusionary misuse of patents; and (3) a retarding 
effect on diffusion and cumulative innovation.78 Patents deter entry or induce exit of 
firms competing with a patent owner. Exclusion of competitors is justified when a firm 
owns a strong and valid patent. But exclusion can also be achieved with the aid of weak 
or invalid patents. A large firm can use the threat of patent litigation to drive smaller 
firms out of a market. The threat may succeed even if the patent is likely invalid or the 
defendant is unlikely to be an infringer. The high cost of defending a patent suit can 
strain the financial resources of a small start-up. Potential entrants will survey market 
                                                                                                                                                 
would appreciate that the single-action ordering techniques can be used in various environments other than 
the Internet." 
76 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908). 
77 Sear’s devised a distribution method that gave it a great cost advantage in retailing in the early 1900s.   
See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 
59-62 (1990).  
 
The heart of the operation…was the scheduling system, which helped assure consistently high 
stock-turn. A complex, rigidly enforced timetable made it possible to fill a steady stream of orders 
from a large number of different departments. Each department was given fifteen minutes to send 
the assembling rooms the items listed on a specific order. If any items failed to appear within that 
time period, the order was shipped without them. The delayed part of the order was sent by 
prepaid express as soon as it was ready, and the negligent department was charged both for the 
extra express cost and for a fine of fifty cents per item. 
 
 Id. at 61. 
78 Kenneth Dam presents a similar list of social costs associated with patents. See Kenneth Dam, The 
Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law,23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247 (1994). 
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niches and try to steer clear of niches with lots of patents, so they can reduce the risk of 
patent litigation. 
Although patents certainly promote innovation they also retard diffusion of 
technology and cumulative innovation. Patent owners slow diffusion by sometimes 
refusing to license their patents, or more commonly, by charging royalties that discourage 
efficient use of patented inventions. Patent owners slow cumulative innovation by 
bargaining for a share of the surplus created by inventors who improve the patented 
invention or use it in their research.79 Naturally, the incentive to improve patented 
inventions is diminished compared to the case in which the improver keeps the entire 
surplus from the improvement.  
Patent floods lead to lower quality patents exacerbating the first two social costs. 
“Low patent quality” is shorthand for such problems as overlapping claims, 
inappropriately broad claims, slow patent prosecution, and patents on obvious 
inventions.80 The problem of overlapping claims is inherent to patent floods because of 
the likelihood of near simultaneous invention and multiple patent applications covering 
the same invention. The other problems arise because of the difficulty the Patent Office 
has dealing with patent floods.81 Time pressure, lack of expertise, and lack of available 
prior art yield low patent quality during floods.82 The Patent Office directs patent 
                                                 
79 Improvers are usually infringers and need a license from the owner of the patent on the basic invention. 
80 See Merges supra note 22 at 590 for a discussion of the low quality of software and business method 
patents. See also Lerner supra note 64, at 24 U.S. Patent No. 5,884,286 entitled “Apparatus and process for 
executing an expiration less option transaction.” Patent does not cite a wealth of academic prior art that 
quite possibly makes the invention unpatentable. Amazon.com, Inc., v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 2001 
U.S. App. Lexis 2163 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Federal Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction against 
Barnes and Noble because of substantial questions about patent validity. 
81 Even a well-run Patent Office will suffer from these problems. For an explanation that good patent 
policy calls for limited resources and a limited examination process see Mark Lemley, Rational Ignorance 
at the Patent Office, forthcoming 95 NW. L. REV. (2001). 
82 The PTO has instituted a mandatory second review of business method patents to increase the quality of 
the examination process. See William M. Bulkeley, Fewer Patents on Methods Get Clearance, WALL ST. 
J., A3,  March 21, 2001. 
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applications to examiners in the field of technology appropriate for the claimed 
invention. A flood in a particular field means that the average time to complete 
prosecution rises as resources are stretched.83 The demand for skilled people in the 
emerging area of technology makes it difficult to attract and retain examiners in the 
field.84 And the technical breakthrough precipitating a flood might not be described in a 
source easily available to patent examiners.85  
Low patent quality increases patent licensing and litigation cost. These costs 
increase because bargaining becomes more difficult and the probability of patent disputes 
grows as quality deteriorates. Delayed patent prosecution, and numerous and overlapping 
patents make it costly for a possible infringer to negotiate a license or even determine 
who to bargain with. Overly broad claims inappropriately expand the number of potential 
infringers and the probability of litigation. And when numerous inventors86 own related 
patents and patent applications there are apt to be disputes about priority or the scope of 
similar claims.87 
Periods of patent flood magnify the problem of exclusionary conduct. Patent 
floods often coincide with the birth of a new industry. The normal life-cycle of an 
                                                 
83 See Chartrand, supra note 62 (The PTO recently increased training, supervision, and staff in response to 
complaints about examination of business method patents.) 
84 See id. (The PTO recently increased training, supervision, and staff in response to complaints about 
examination of business method patents.); Patenting Business Methods, A White Paper of the AIPLA, 
November 27, 2000 www.aipla.org/html/whitepaper2.html (calling for better training of examiners and 
better collection of prior art by the PTO). 
85 See Lerner supra note 64, at 26-27; see also Sabra Chartrand, Federal Agency Rethinks Internet Patents: 
Government Changing Its Evaluations of Business-Method Filings, N. Y. Times, March 30, 2000. Critics 
claim the PTO does not understand what business methods are widely used or already in the public 
domain. 
86 The flood of finance patents is distributed to a large and diverse collection of patent owners. See Lerner 
supra note 64, at 9. 
87 See Teresa Riordan, Patents: Historians Take a Longer View of Net Battles, N.Y. Times, April 10, 2000. 
"The most extreme example of simultaneous development is when you have Alexander Graham Bell and 
Elisha Gray arriving at the patent office on the same day with the idea of the telephone," said Winston, 
who is the author of "Media Technology and Society: A History From the Telegraph to the Internet."  
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industry begins with a large number of small firms, followed by a period of shake-out 
when many firms fail.88 Thus, there is a large population of start-ups that are vulnerable 
to exclusionary tactics, and low quality patent examination makes it easy for a dominant 
firm intent on exclusion to collect a portfolio of patents.89 Even if the patent flood does 
not promote socially unwarranted exclusionary tactics, it may have a negative impact on 
industry evolution. The patent flood raises the cost of entry to the new market and overly 
broad or invalid patents may favor inefficient producers who survive the shake-out at the 
expense of more efficient but patent-poor firms.90  
These problems are becoming apparent in e-commerce markets that have entered 
the shake-out phase.91 Commentators predict huge amounts of patent litigation.92 Weak 
                                                                                                                                                 
Gray and Bell settled their differences, with Gray getting a $100,000 settlement and lucrative contract 
work. But the early days of the telephone were marked by many other patent disputes. At one point the Bell 
System had 600 pending patent infringement cases. 
88 See Steven Klepper and Elizabeth Graddy, The Evolution of New Industries and the Determinants of 
Market Structure, 21 RAND J. ECON. 27, 28-35 (1990) (gathering evidence that shows that new industries 
first experience rapid entry, followed by a shake-out phase when many more firms exit than enter, and 
finally a mature phase with a steady number of firms). 
89 Dominant firms can patent their own inventions and purchase patent rights from other firms, especially 
those exiting the market during a shake-out. See e.g.,  Kevin G. Rivette and David Kline, Discovering New 
Value in Intellectual Property, HARV. BUS. REV. 54, 64 (Jan.-Feb. 2000) ( stent manufacturer bought out 
a company to gain access to its patent portfolio to bolster its position in a patent infringement suit); 
Gwendolyn Mariano, Net Shakeout More Sweeping Than Expected, CNET NEWS.COM,  N. Y. Times, 
June 4, 2001 (“incredible” rate of acquisition of failed Internet firms). 
90 See Klepper & Graddy, supra note 81 at 28. In their model “factors governing the early evolution of 
industries will shape their market structure at maturity.” Specifically, the model shows that increasing the 
cost of imitation in a new industry tends to raise the level of concentration as the industry matures.  
Rivette & Kline, supra note 82, at 66. Patents are often decisive in determining which firms survive the 
shakeout phase of the industrial life cycle. 
91 See Bob Tedeschi, When Digital Darwinists Seek Their Predators June 25, 2000 N. Y. Times (shake-out 
of Internet retailers causing a wave of consolidation); Mariano, supra note 82; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business? 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER AND HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 263, x (2000). 
92 For example, the two major remaining providers of free Internet access are suing each other over 
infringement of patents that cover aspects of Internet advertising critical to their business model. See Matt 
Richtel, NetZero Sues Juno Online in a Patent Dispute, N. Y. Times, Dec. 28, 2000. Stern supra note 61, 
at 105 collects the following references in note 98: “See ‘Boom’ in Business Method Patent Filings Has 
Followed State Street Ruling, PTO Says, Pat. Trademark & Copr. J. (BNA) 115 (Dec. 10, 1998). Forbes 
Magazine suggests that e-commerce magnates may ‘try to turn patents into the barbed wire of the Internet.’ 
Josh McHugh, Barbed Wire on the Internet, Forbes, May 17, 1999, at 183. The American Banker asserts 
that the State Street decision ‘threatens to embroil the financial services industry in hundreds of patent 
infringement lawsuits,’ creating possible liability exceeding $2 billion. Jaret Seidberg, Ruling Threatens 
Banks With Patent Lawsuits, Am. Banker, Sept. 2, 1998, at 3. A story in IP Magazine warns that ‘a 
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or invalid business method patents might be used to deter entry,93 or induce firms to 
accept licenses.94 Moreover, patent suits instead of efficiency will shape the structure of 
the industry by encouraging mergers.95 
Patent floods also exacerbate the costs from slowed diffusion and cumulative 
innovation.96 The transaction costs associated with obtaining numerous licenses may 
retard technical progress.97 These transaction costs probably rise faster than the number 
of patents because multilateral bargaining is more difficult than bilateral bargaining.  
Furthermore, the flood of patents increases the likelihood that different parties will own 
patents on complementary inventions – i.e., inventions that efficiency dictates should be 
used together. The owners of complementary patents have an incentive to charge 
combined license fees even higher than the monopoly license fee.98 Finally, when a 
technical breakthrough opens a new market, a flood of business method patents could 
                                                                                                                                                 
firestorm of litigation threatens to engulf corporate America’ and predicts ‘large-scale disruption of U.S. 
commerce, as sharp operators move to patent business methods and assert patents against the 
unsuspecting.’ Robert M. Kunstadt, Opening Pandora's Box, IP Mag., Jan. 1999 (visited May 12, 1999) 
<http:// www.ipmag.com/monthly/99-jan/kunstadt.html>.” 
93 See Shapiro supra note 58, at 34 “Our current patent system is causing a potentially dangerous situation 
in several fields, including biotechnology, semiconductors, computer software, and e-commerce in which a 
would-be entrepreneur or innovator may face a barrage of infringement actions that it must overcome to 
bring its product or service to market. In other words, we are in danger of creating significant transactions 
costs for those seeking to commercialize new technology based on multiple patents, overlapping rights, and 
hold-up problems.” Dreyfuss, supra note 84 at 270 (entry deterrent effect created by business method 
patents that are likely to be invalid). 
94 See Seth Shulman, Software Patents Tangle the Web, 103 TECHNOLOGY REV. 68, 71-72 (March/April 
2000). There will be a lot of cross-licensing of e-commerce patents because a lot of the patents are invalid. 
Even though the odds of invalidity are high the patents are powerful weapons. 
95 See James Gleick, Patently Absurd, New York Times Magazine, March 12, 2000. (New e-commerce 
patents will continue to flood the PTO and surprise entrepreneurs. Patent suits are a catalyst for mergers.) 
96 See Matt Richtel, Chairman of Amazon Urges Reduction of Patent Terms: Bezos Suggests 3 to 5 Years, 
Instead of 20, N. Y. Times, March 12, 2000. The chairman of Amazon.com has acknowledged that 
business method patents may stifle others from building upon the patented innovations. “He is calling for 
the government to limit patents for software and Internet business models to three to five years and to 
require a period for public comment on patent applications in those areas before they are granted.” 
97 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 59; Riordan, supra note 80. "A radio patent pool was finally formed 
in 1919," said historian Amy Friedlander. "One of the reasons it was formed was there were so many 
patents and so much cross-licensing that development of radio had become almost sclerotic." Shulman, 
supra note 87, at 76 (describing a thicket of patents that created problems for development of automobiles 
and airplanes in the U.S). 
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block commercial exploitation of the underlying technology. The cost of negotiating 
appropriate business method patent licenses reduces the incentive effect of broad patent 
protection for a technical pioneer.99 
V. CAN POOLING AND CROSS-LICENSING SOLVE THE PROBLEMS 
CREATED BY PATENT FLOODS? 
 Patent floods usually induce extensive patent licensing managed through patent 
pools or cross-licensing agreements.100 A patent license is a contract in which a patent 
owner grants the licensee permission to practice the patented invention.101 Cross-
licensing describes reciprocal patent licenses that two or more patent owners grant to 
each other. Pooling is more comprehensive than cross-licensing. Patent pools include 
many members and gather most or all of the patents in an industry.102 Typically, a pool 
issues a blanket license authorizing use of all the patents in the pool.103 The license 
revenue is distributed to members in proportion to the value of the patents they have 
contributed to the pool.104  
Pools and cross-licensing mitigate two of the negative effects of patent floods. 
They reduce transaction costs and avoid the uncertainty and litigation cost created by a 
flood of patents.105 The blanket license eliminates worries about patent litigation based 
                                                                                                                                                 
98 See Shapiro supra note 58, at 6-10 (complementary patents are priced too high and hidden patents create 
a danger of hold-up) 
99 Thanks to Pam Samuelson for suggesting this point. 
100 Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights 
Organizations 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 note 162 (1996) (citing patent consolidation in over 20 industries 
in the early part of the twentieth century). 
101 A patent owner may refuse to license without violating antitrust law. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 
645 F.2d 1195, 1204 (2nd Cir., 1981). But patent owners have many reasons to license. Jean Tirole, The 
Theory of Industrial Organization 410-13 1988  
102 Members of the pool assign their patents to a holding company or trade association. See Merges supra  
note 93, at 1341-42. 
103 See id.  at 1341-42. 
104 See id.  at 1341-42. 
105 George L. Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20 J.L. & ECON. 309 (1977). pp. 358-59 
(noting that pools reduce litigation and uncertainty). Robert P. Merges, Symposium: Toward A Third 
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on any of the patents in the pool. Transaction costs are low because monitoring costs are 
reduced for patent owners and licensees only need to negotiate a single blanket license. 
For the same reasons, they also cut through a thicket of patents that otherwise could stall 
production and development in an industry facing a patent flood.106 On the other hand, 
pooling and cross-licensing may cause a variety of anticompetitive harms. 
Antitrust law shows considerable deference to patent licenses.107 The owner of a 
broad patent on an important invention is supposed to enjoy significant exclusionary 
power and monopoly profit regardless of whether the patent is licensed. High profit is 
supposed to provide the incentive to seek important inventions. Thus, a cross-license 
agreement should be able to secure monopoly profits for the owners of a pair of essential, 
complementary inventions.108 A similar statement holds for licenses settling priority 
disputes. A license that allows two inventors to split the monopoly profit from an 
invention serves social welfare if one of them is surely entitled to the patent.109 Despite 
these benefits anticompetitive harms do exist. Pools and cross-licensing can insulate 
invalid patents from challenge, expand the scope of minor patents, and facilitate collusive 
pricing. 
Pools and cross-licensing pose anticompetitive threats because: it is hard to 
distinguish settlement of a legitimate priority dispute from a cross-license between the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Intellectual Property Paradigm: Comments: Of Property Rules, Coase, And Intellectual Property 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994) (noting that patent pooling in the radio industry reduced transaction costs). 
106 The Patent Office has touted patent pools as the solution to the problem created by the thicket of gene 
patents. See USPTO, Patent Pools: A Solution to the Problem of Access in Biotechnology Patents? 
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patpoolcover.html, December 5, 2000. See also Shapiro supra 
note 58, at x (approving pooling of complementary patents to fight through patent thicket). 
107 Joint price and output choice is not per se illegal when practiced by a pool. Cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 
CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979) (price fixing by a copyright pool). 
108 More precisely, if the a single owner of the pair of complementary patents can command a monopoly 
profit, then two owners should be allowed to get the same profit through cross-licensing. 
109 Again, if the patent securely in the hands of one of the inventors generates monopoly profit, then there 
is no problem with a license that allows two inventors to split the monopoly profit. 
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owners of two sham patents; and it is hard to distinguish settlement of a legitimate 
dispute about scope of claims and infringement from a cross-license between the owners 
of two minor patents. 110 Many patents issued during a flood cover insignificant 
inventions and many patents are invalid. Licensing to settle patent litigation might be a 
socially desirable way to avoid litigation cost, but it also might be part of a collusive 
strategy.111  
The other anticompetitive threat is a pool or cross-licensing agreement justified as 
a way to cut through a patent thicket and economize on transaction costs might actually 
serve merely to orchestrate collusion on prices. A patent license may include terms that 
would normally violate the antitrust rule against price fixing. For example, a license 
might specify the sale price, geographic market, or output level of the end product made 
using a patent.112 Such terms make it easier to establish and enforce a cartel.113 If the 
patents in the pool are substitutes, the effect is similar to firms merging to monopoly.114 
Antitrust law gives us many likely examples of patent pools facilitating collusion.115  
                                                 
110 Pooling or cross-licensing patents on competing technologies may be anticompetitive if excluded firms 
need a license to effectively compete in the relevant market. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995) ("IP 
Guidelines"), reprinted at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm. 
111See Michael J. Meurer, The Settlement of Patent Litigation, 20 RAND J. ECON 77 (1989). Cf. Priest, 
supra note 98, at 309-310 (describing the difficulty in distinguishing legitimate patent exploitation from 
patent licenses used to orchestrate a cartel).  
112 See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN 
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 830-31 (2000).   
113 George Priest has suggested the license agreement between G.E. and Westinghouse might have been 
used to fix price. See Priest, supra note 98, at x; but see United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 
(1926) (sustaining validity of patent license. See also Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory 
of Self-Enforcing Collusion 87 COLUM. L. REV. 295 (1987); Summit Technology, Inc., Dkt. No. 9286 
(August 21, 1998) available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9808/d0928viagr.htm> (FTC claimed a patent 
pool was protecting an invalid patent). 
114 See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1867-68 
(1984). 
 
The problem of patent accumulation, the aggregation of several or numerous patents under single 
ownership or control, is conceptually indistinguishable from the merger problem under antitrust 
law. . . . A pool of competing patents can be more readily analogized to a loose association than to 
a horizontal merger. This, of course, depends upon one’s evaluation of the pool’s efficiency-
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The risk of price-fixing disguised as a patent pool is surely deterred by the threat 
of antitrust enforcement — likewise agreements that expand patent scope or protect 
invalid patents. Yet, deterrence alone is probably inadequate because of a substantial 
danger of undetected collusion.116 Deterrence is also limited because enforcement 
agencies fear that overzealous antitrust enforcement will discourage socially desirable 
pools and cross-licenses. The Department of Justice (DOJ) announced guidelines that 
help fine tune public antitrust enforcement.117 But, we should not be too optimistic that 
antitrust law can finely distinguish pro-competitive from anti-competitive pooling and 
cross-licensing.118 
 The previous discussion might suggest to some readers that pooling or cross-
licensing inevitably follows a patent flood — but that is not true. The multi-party 
                                                                                                                                                 
creating potential. A pool of competing patents is difficult to distinguish from the cartel in this 
respect. 
Id. 
115 See e.g., Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 38 S. Ct. 9 (1912); Hartford-Empire 
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 65 S. Ct. 373, 89 L. Ed. 322 (1945); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. 
Nelson, On The Complex Economics Of Patent Scope 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 896 (1990) (cartelization 
by the light bulb patent pool); Merges, supra note 93, at n224, (cartelization by pool in United States v. 
National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 323 U.S. 319 (1947)); Priest, supra note 
98, at 330-32 (pooling of harrow patents used to cartelize the harrow market); id. at 366-370 (weighing 
strong evidence of both efficiency and collusion in relation to a pool of patents relating to methods of 
refining petroleum). See generally id. 
116 See, id. at 329 (noting that with cross-licensing it is more difficult to distinguish cartelization from 
legitimate exploitation); Kaplow supra note 107, at 1865-67. Antitrust scrutiny failed to detect collusion in 
Standard Oil Co., 283 U.S. 163 (upholding a pool made up of competing patents when its examination 
failed to uncover any restraint of trade or monopolization).  
117 Two important rules of thumb are that pooled patents should be complements not substitutes. See Priest, 
supra note 98, at 357-58 (distinguishing cross-licensing of substitute and complementary patents), and pool 
members must reasonably fear infringing each others’ patents Merges, supra  note 93, at note 225 (“Where 
industry members are seen to pervasively infringe each other's patents, and where valuation and exchange 
mechanisms appear to serve no ulterior purpose beyond setting compensation for these infringements, a 
real working pool is in effect.” ) The DOJ view pooling as procompetitive when it integrates 
complementary inventions, and reduces transaction and litigation costs. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
(1995) ("IP Guidelines"), reprinted at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm. Open 
licensing of non-members helps protect a pool from antitrust violation. See also Mark A. Lemley & David 
McGowan Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 538 (1998). Cf. 
USPTO supra note 99  (encouraging patent pooling as a solution to the problems caused by the flood of 
gene patents). 
118 See Priest supra note 98; Merges,  supra note 93. 
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bargaining problem facing patent owners is a major impediment. History shows that 
agreements are easier to reach in industries with homogeneous members who deal with 
each other repeatedly.119 History also shows longstanding bargaining impasses are 
possible.120In addition, the threat of antitrust litigation may deter some pools and cross-
licensing agreements.121 
VI. FLOOD CONTROL: REDUCING THE FREQUENCY OF BUSINESS 
METHOD PATENT FLOODS 
 Sections 101 and 103 of the Patent Act offer opportunities to reduce the frequency 
of patent floods by limiting the extent to which business methods are patentable subject 
matter or by making it difficult to show business method inventions are nonobvious. At 
this early stage we cannot be sure how broadly the Federal Circuit will read State Street. 
Experience with software patentability suggests the court will read it quite broadly.122 It 
is also too early to know how rigorously the Section 103 nonobviousness requirement 
will be applied to business methods. In this section I will list some possibilities, and 
consider the consequences for patent floods. 
 Two questions left open from State Street are critical to determining the extent of 
business method patentability. First, are business methods lacking a software 
implementation patentable? Second, what kinds of methods are useful, tangible, and 
                                                 
119See Merges supra note 93, at 1341. 
120 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 108, at 896-897 (“There is therefore no guarantee that pooling, cross 
licensing, or consolidation will always emerge to break an industry impasse. And without these solutions 
there is nothing to mitigate the effect of broad basic patents in cumulative technology industries. Earlier we 
saw that theory offered a number of reasons to be concerned about these patents. The historical evidence 
available is consistent with this theory. In most instances this evidence can be read as supportive of our 
concerns about the effects of broad patents on cumulative technology industries.”) 
121 See Merges supra  note 93, at 1355. But favorable business review letters from the DOJ have 
encouraged three recent patent pools.The DOJ issued business review letters sanctioning three recent 
patent pools to share royalties from patents covering the MPEG 2 compression technology standard, and 
patents on certain DVD-Video and DVD-ROM standard specifications and products. See USPTO supra 
note 99; Steven C. Carlson, Note: Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. REG. 359 (1999) 
(describing patent pools covering video compression and encryption technology). 
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concrete? State Street and the follow-up case AT&T v. Excel are surprisingly vague on 
these matters.123 A narrow reading treats these two cases as software cases holding that 
there is no reason to discriminate against software merely because it has a business 
purpose.124 Under this narrow reading business method claims lacking a software 
implementation could be rejected for being outside the bounds of patentable processes. 
Yet, even given this narrow reading, State Street will have a significant economic impact 
because software based claims will often preempt any practical use of a business 
method.125  
A broad reading of these cases opens the door to patents on the full spectrum of 
management techniques. A software limitation on patentable subject matter might not be 
required since Judge Rich nowhere limited his ruling to software and he cited old 
business method cases predating computer technology.126 Additionally, language in State 
Street emphasizes there is no need for a physical transformation to make a process 
patentable.127 If patentable processes are freed from a connection with physical 
                                                                                                                                                 
122 See Raskind, supra note 9, at 33 (1999) (forecasting further decline of subject matter boundaries). 
123 See id.. at 62. “[T]he recent decision which announced this startling conclusion provides neither 
explanation, limitation, nor rationale.” See Thomas, supra note 67, at 25-27 (1999) (criticizing the 
arguments made by Judge Rich as he rejected the business method exception). 
124 Francisco Marius Keeley-Domokos, Intellectual Property: State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature 
Financial Group, Inc. 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 153 (1999) Instead, the business methods that will 
continue to be patented will probably involve computer software, and will also qualify as machines through 
proper use of means-plus- function claims. 
125 State Street at 1371 (computer essential to practice method). 
126 John Kasdan, Obviousness and New Technologies, 10 FORDHAM INTELLECTUAL PROP., MEDIA & 
ENTERTAINMENT L. J 159 (1999). (“Since he referred to cases from as long ago as 1908 which far pre-
date the computer, it is arguably the case that Rich was suggesting that even business methods which are 
implemented without the use of a computer should be eligible for patent protection (although it appears 
that, under current practice, the PTO would reject such applications)” 
127 See Merges supra note 22 at note 24. (“Indeed, there is a fair argument that a business concept is 
patentable whether or not it is implemented on a computer: [In State Street Bank] the Federal Circuit 
indicated that whether an invention is directed to patentable subject matter under § 101 does not depend on 
whether a "physical" transformation takes place or whether the claim is directed to a process or a machine. 
From this, it might then follow that a claimed process for, e.g., performing the function similar to 
Signature's invention, is patentable even absent its use with a computer. As long as the variables represent 
some set monetary values, it arguably should not matter who or what does the "transforming." After all, 
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apparatus, then the full range of business methods discussed in Part II may be patentable 
subject matter.128 Of course, it is possible that the words “useful, tangible, and concrete” 
will be invoked to limit the range of business methods that are patentable.129 
Policy arguments are not much of a guide in predicting how broadly the Federal 
Circuit will interpret State Street. The policy arguments for and against expanding 
patentable subject matter to include business methods are not well developed. Proponents 
favor the broadest reach of patentable subject matter consistent with the statute and the 
Constitution.130 They believe that the incentive effect created by patent property rights is 
desirable in any field of innovation. Opponents claim that 200 years of experience shows 
that there is adequate incentive to invent new business methods even if the methods are 
not patentable.131 They oppose patents because they could create market power and slow 
                                                                                                                                                 
regardless of the transforming mechanism (e.g., machine or human), the invention can be said to have 
"practical utility," and produce a "useful, concrete and tangible result.") 
128 See Thomas, supra note 67, at 6 “Disconnected from particular physical apparatus, such patents will set 
forth not so much technical artifacts, but a broad category of proprietary modes of analysis, techniques and 
protocols from disciplines ranging from the social sciences to the law.” 
129 See Keeley-Domokos supra note 117, at x. (“The type of business methods that are likely to benefit 
from the State Street decision, however, are probably more material than just general functional operating 
schemes. The court in State Street repeatedly reiterated the utility of the invention disclosed in Signature's 
patent, while concurrently emphasizing the concreteness and materiality of the result that the invention 
achieved. The State Street decision seems to indicate that to be patentable, business methods must achieve 
concrete and material results in addition to being useful. If this interpretation is correct, it would probably 
be difficult for a company to prove that a general operating business plan developed by that company 
deserves patent protection. To satisfy the requirements of concreteness and materiality, such a company 
would probably have to provide conclusive evidence that the new business method decreases operating 
costs, increases productivity, or achieves some other tangible economic benefit. Such an analysis would 
probably involve complex forecasting techniques and rely on economic assumptions and projections. The 
speculative nature of such endeavors probably reduces the likelihood that companies will attempt to patent 
general business operating methods.”) 
130 State Street at 1373 subject matter broadest possible reading because Congress did not intend any 
limitations. Malla Pollock argues that the business method patent in State Street violates the Intellectual 
Property Clause of the Constitution. See Malla Pollock, The Possible Unconstitutionality of Business 
Method Patents: Common Sense and History, forthcoming, Rutgers Computer & Tech. L. J. (2001). 
131 See Raskind, supra note 9, at 92-93 (1999) (adequate incentive for innovation in business methods 
without patent protection) See Thomas, supra note 67, at 58 (favoring a restriction of method patents to 
industrial applications). 
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diffusion of new business methods.132 Regardless of the merit of this reason for opposing 
patents on business methods but it has not impressed the Federal Circuit so far.133 
Congress or the courts should revive the business method exception, or at least 
adopt a narrow reading that limits business method patents to methods with a software 
implementation. Reviving the business method exception would return us to a world in 
which customer service methods get relatively little intellectual property protection.134 
Some administrative methods would still be eligible for patent protection and many 
would benefit from trade secret protection. I greatly prefer trade secret protection because 
most of the flood problems I described in Part IV apply to patents but not trade secrets.135 
A broad reading of State Street is most harmful because it allows full patentability of 
customer service methods, but even a narrow reading allows patents protecting financial 
securities like Signature’s invention. 
                                                 
132 See Dreyfuss, supra note 84, at 275 (arguing the social cost of business method patents exceed the 
social benefits).  
133 Let me take a moment to comment a little further on policy analysis of the bounds of patentable subject 
matter. The core trade-off in judging the social value of a patent compares the increased incentive to invent 
arising from the prospect of a patent to the decreased diffusion of the invention because of the exclusionary 
power of a patent. Proponents argue that this trade-off should be implemented on a case-by-case basis via 
the nonobviousness standard of Section 103. They could argue that the subject matter boundary seems like 
a poor alternative policy instrument because the trade-off is made for a class of inventions rather than a 
specific invention. I would respond by claiming that cost savings justify exclusion of business methods 
through Section 101 because a proper nonobviousness analysis (based on the economic trade-off) would 
deny patents to most business method inventions. 
 The scope of patent rights can be analyzed from other perspectives. See e.g., F. Scott Kieff, 
Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001) 
(arguing that patent policy should be guided by concerns about commercializing technology). 
134 Trade secret protection is unlikely because marketing methods, product features, and product varieties 
cannot be kept secret. Trademark and copyright law offer some protection to customer service methods. 
Recently, we have learned that trademark law can be used to protect a method of selling Mexican food. See 
Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana. And copyright offers limited protection to business methods. See Rinaldo Del 
Gallo, III, Are "Methods of Doing Business" Finally Out of Business as a Statutory Rejection?, 38 IDEA 
403, 405 (1998). But see Stern, supra note 61, at 112-116 (1999) (stringent limits to copyright protection 
of business methods copyright law can be used to protect). 
135 Trade secrets cannot be used to exclude competitors or slow cumulative innovation or diffusion because 
independent invention is allowed under trade secret law. Trade secrets do generate significant litigation and 
they lack the disclosure feature of patent law. 
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Even if State Street is reversed there will still be some degree of patent protection 
available to business methods. The reason is that some methods useful in business have 
applications in technical fields as well. Some older business method applications that 
were claimed as software perished on subject matter grounds because they were viewed 
as too abstract; but others escaped rejection on subject matter grounds. A prominent 
example is the linear programming algorithm invented by Karmarkar and patented by 
AT&T. This sort of algorithm has engineering applications but its most profitable 
application for AT&T has been to management problems.136 The engineering 
applications of the Karmarkar algorithm leave no doubt about patentability.  
Expanded patent protection does not matter if firms choose trade secret protection 
in preference to patents.137 This is most likely for administrative method inventions.138 
Many of these methods are easy to keep secret and have a limited number of potential 
customers.139 Secret use by potential infringers makes patents hard to enforce.140 Trade 
secret protection is also preferable for firms who are concerned about imitation by 
competitors outside of the U.S. since business methods are not patentable elsewhere.141 
                                                 
136 AT&T sold software containing the algorithm at about $1 million per copy to airlines that use it for 
scheduling flights. U.S. Patent No. 4,744,028. See generally Mark Paley, The Karmarkar Patent: Why 
Congress Should "Open The Door" to Algorithms as Patentable Subject Matter,The Computer Law 
Reporter 7 (Sept. 1995). 
137 Jared Earl Grusd, Internet Business Methods: What Role Does and Should Patent Law Play? 4 VA. J.L. 
& TECH. 9 (1999) (discussing the importance of trade secret protection of business methods). 
138 Dell and Walmart both owe their success to innovative distribution and marketing. Dell relies mostly on 
patent protection of its business methods while Walmart relies on trade secret protection. See Kevin G. 
Rivette and David Kline, Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property, HARV. BUS. REV. 54, 57 (Jan.-
Feb. 2000). Firms have the strongest incentive to patent administrative methods that are broadly applicable. 
Relevant examples include just-in-time inventory, scheduling techniques, quality circles, the M-form of 
corporate organization, or the hub and spoke air delivery system pioneered by Fed Ex. 
139 Often these methods are tailored specifically to a particular corporation; they are tailored to reflect that 
corporation’s culture. Since the inventor is a manager in the corporation that is apt to be the only customer 
for the method, there is little reason to get a patent. 
140 Infringement is especially difficult to detect when the infringing manager practices the method in her 
head. In the early days of software patents commentators recognized a mental steps doctrine that would 
block software claims that are so abstract that they can be infringed by thought. 
141 See President of the European Patent Office Examination of "business method" applications, (Munich, 
19.05.00) www.uspto.gov/web/tws/appendix6.pdf  (“Methods of doing business are, according to Article 
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The disclosure from the patent application would disseminate the invention to foreign 
users. Furthermore, fear of nonobviousness invalidation might encourage trade secret 
protection. Secret prior art and a vast body of poorly catalogued prior art might make 
inventors worry about validity attacks based on prior art unavailable to the examiner. One 
more factor favors trade secrecy. The first inventor defense reduces the risk to trade 
secret owners that a later inventor will sue them as infringers.142 Expanding the scope of 
this defense to include any prior user is a desirable, if indirect, way to minimize the 
number of business method patents.143 
It is possible but unlikely that future floods of business method patents will be 
avoided by rigorous screening via the nonobviousness standard.144 Section 103 has not 
presented much of a barrier in the PTO to persistent e-commerce patent applicants. Patent 
examiners find it difficult to reject applications on obvious inventions because they lack 
access to the prior art they need to document their basis for rejection.145 Weak patents 
                                                                                                                                                 
52(2) EPC, not to be considered to be inventions. Although not explicitly stated, this exclusion is also 
considered to apply to a wide range of subject-matters which, while not literally methods of doing 
business, share the same quality of being concerned more with interpersonal, societal and financial 
relationships, than 
with the stuff of engineering - thus for example, valuation of assets, advertising, teaching, choosing among 
candidates for a job, etc.. The term "business methods" has become a generally used shorthand for all of 
these areas.”) 
142 The "First Inventor Defense Act of 1999" Subtitle C provides a defense against charges of patent 
infringement for a party who had, in good faith, actually reduced the subject matter to practice at least one 
year before the effective filing date of the patent, and commercially used the subject matter before the 
effective filing date. The defense is limited to methods of "doing or conducting business." Section 273 
creates a new “First Inventor Defense.”  The defense is available against business method claims if the 
defendant acted in good faith and reduced to practice the claimed invention more than one year before the 
effective filing date of such patent, and commercially used the invention before the filing date. 
143 See Dreyfuss, supra note 84, at 272 (noting the limited scope of first inventor defense); Patenting 
Business Methods, A White Paper of the AIPLA, November 27, 2000 
www.aipla.org/html/whitepaper2.html (opposing special treatment of business method patents) 
144 Jared Earl Grusd, Internet Business Methods: What Role Does and Should Patent Law Play? 4 VA. J.L. 
& TECH. 9 (1999). (“Unlike most commentators, the author will argue that the State Street holding does 
not necessarily lower the standard for obtaining patents on business methods. The State Street holding 
merely shifts the patent inquiry away from the 35 U.S.C. § 101 subject matter analysis to the novelty, 
utility, nonobviousness, and specification inquiries.”) 
145 “To establish a prima facie case of obviousness, three basic criteria must be met. First, there must be 
some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available 
to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings. Second, there 
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still might be invalidated in court but much of the harm associated with patent floods is 
done when the PTO issues the patents.146  
However, the problem is not just with application of the obviousness test in the 
PTO, the standard itself is too lenient (at least as applied to business method 
inventions).147 The increasing reliance on secondary considerations makes the 
obviousness hurdle too low.148 Secondary considerations are economic or motivational 
factors that indirectly prove nonobviousness. They include “commercial success, long 
felt but unresolved needs, failure of others, etc. ...”149 Especially troubling is the use of 
commercial success as an indicator of nonobviousness. The nexus between commercial 
success and a business method invention should be quite easy to establish. Another 
problematic aspect of obviousness doctrine is the requirement that the examiner must 
show the prior art contains a motivation or teaching to modify old methods. I suspect that 
many future business method inventions will consist of melding old business methods 
with new technologies, or updating old methods for new markets.150  John Kasdan 
                                                                                                                                                 
must be a reasonable expectation of success. Finally, the prior art reference (or references when combined) 
must teach or suggest all the claim limitations.” Formulating and Communicating Rejections under 35 
U.S.C. 103 For Applications Directed to Computer-Implemented Business Method Inventions 
www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/busmeth103rej.htm. The dissent in Alappat at 1553-54 criticizes the 
majority’s reasoning and suggests a danger that music CDs are now patentable as a manufacture, because 
they are novel, and the PTO would not be able to show obvious. 
146 The Federal Circuit expressed skepticism about the nonobviousness of one of the first e-commerce 
patents to be litigated in Amazon.com, Inc., v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 2163  
(Fed. Cir. 2001). pp. 59-60 “substantial question of validity raised by the prior art references cited by BN 
and discussed herein.” 
147 There is not much chance that the Federal Circuit would adopt a more rigorous standard of 
nonobviousness for business method patent applications, because it insists the standard of nonobviousness 
is invariant across fields of invention. 
148 The district court in the Amazon case relied on secondary considerations to support its conclusion of 
nonobviousness. It mentioned copying of the invention by others and solution of a long-felt unmet need. 
149 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
150 The PTO insists there is some bite to Section 103 as applied to e-commerce patents. Recent guidelines 
are reassuring on the point that “merely providing an automatic means to replace a manual activity which 
accomplishes the same result is not sufficient to” to satisfy 103. See, Formulating and Communicating 
Rejections under 35 U.S.C. 103 For Applications Directed to Computer-Implemented Business Method 
Inventions www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/busmeth103rej.htm (citing In re Venner, 262 F.2d 91, 95, 
120 USPQ 193, 194 (CCPA 1958)). The guidelines also observe “The Internet, to one ordinarily skilled in 
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illustrates this point by citing the Priceline.com patent on an Internet version of the 
reverse auction method that has been around for a long time.151 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 I have argued that the social cost of business method patents may be higher than 
other types of patents because of the problem of patent floods. Business method 
inventions are likely to cluster around the time that a new market opens. The cluster of 
inventions gives rise to a flood of patents. Patent floods create social costs that exceed the 
simple aggregate of the social costs associated with each patent in the flood. Those costs 
are attributable to increased licensing and litigation costs, an increased danger of 
anticompetitive exclusionary use of patents, and a stifling of refinement and application 
of the patented inventions.  
 I am particularly troubled by patents on business methods that I call customer 
service methods. Customer service methods relate to marketing, product features, and 
product varieties. In comparison to administrative methods, customer service methods are 
likely to cluster around the time a new market opens, and thereby create flood problems. I 
fear that customer service methods are especially likely to create a patent thicket that 
slows cumulative innovation and diffusion, and institutions like patent pools may not 
emerge to solve these problems because of the uncertain valuation of these inventions 
and the heterogeneity of the inventions and patent owners. Trade secret law rather than 
 
the art, for some time now is recognized as a vehicle in which information is shared from computer to 
computer.” Id. These comments seem correct but do not really address my concerns. See William M. 
Bulkeley, U.S. Patent Office Slows the Pace of Patents for Business Methods WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(“Critics charge that many business methods being patented are simply computerizing activities that are 
obvious and have been done with paper and pencil in the past.”) See Dreyfuss, supra note 84, at 278-79 
(warning the courts not to allow patents on well known business methods just because they have a software 
implementation). 
151 See Kasdan supra note 119, at x. He speculates that the PTO “may not have found the Priceline.com 
patent … to be obvious because, following the directives of the Federal Circuit, they were unable to find 
anything in the literature suggesting that it might be a good idea to computerize such transactions.” 
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patent law will often be chosen by companies to protect administrative methods, 
therefore making them patentable subject matter might not have significant effects. 
 
 
